Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus experimental transmission using a pig model by Vergara-Alert, Júlia et al.
R A P I D COMMUN I C A T I ON
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus experimental
transmission using a pig model
J. Vergara-Alert1 | V. S. Raj2 | M. Mu~noz1 | F. X. Abad1 | I. Cordon1 |
B. L. Haagmans2 | A. Bensaid1 | J. Segales3,4
1IRTA, Centre de Recerca en Sanitat Animal
(CReSA, IRTA-UAB), Bellaterra, Spain
2Department of Viroscience, Erasmus
Medical Center, Rotterdam, The
Netherlands
3UAB, Centre de Recerca en Sanitat Animal
(CReSA, IRTA-UAB), Bellaterra, Spain
4Facultat de Veterinaria, Departament de
Sanitat i Anatomia Animals, UAB, Bellaterra,
Barcelona, Spain
Correspondence
J. Segales, Campus de la Universitat




Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI) and the
European Commission, Grant/Award
Number: Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI)
grant 115760; CERCA Programme/
Generalitat de Catalunya to IRTA
Summary
Dromedary camels are the main reservoir of Middle East respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus (MERS-CoV), but other livestock species (i.e., alpacas, llamas, and pigs) are
also susceptible to infection with MERS-CoV. Animal-to-animal transmission in alpa-
cas was reported, but evidence for transmission in other species has not been
proved. This study explored pig-to-pig MERS-CoV transmission experimentally. Virus
was present in nasal swabs of infected animals, and limited amounts of viral RNA,
but no infectious virus were detected in the direct contact pigs. No virus was
detected in the indirect contact group. Furthermore, direct and indirect contact pigs
did not develop specific antibodies against MERS-CoV. Therefore, the role of pigs
as reservoir is probably negligible, although it deserves further confirmation.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was first
detected in 2012 in Saudi Arabia, and it causes severe acute respiratory
illness with fever, cough and shortness of breath (Zaki, van Boheemen,
Bestebroer, Osterhaus, & Fouchier, 2012). Up to date, it has caused
1952 human infections, including 693 related deaths (World Health
Organization (WHO), 2017). Dromedaries are the natural reservoir of
MERS-CoV (Sabir et al., 2016). However, other animal species such as
non-human primates (rhesus macaques and common marmosets),
members of the family Camelidae (alpacas and llamas), rabbits and pigs
have been demonstrated to be susceptible to MERS-CoV infection
(Crameri et al., 2016; Falzarano et al., 2014; Haagmans et al., 2015;
Munster, de Wit, & Feldmann, 2013; Vergara-Alert, van den Brand,
et al., 2017; de Wit et al., 2013, 2017). The finding that pigs can be
infected with MERS-CoV would suggest that other Suidae might be
susceptible to the virus. Indeed, common warthogs (Phacochoerus
africanus), bushpig (Potamochoerus larvatus) and wild boars are com-
monly found in the Greater Horn of Africa or the Middle East, sharing
the same habitats and water sources with dromedaries (Cumming,
2008; Vergara-Alert, Vidal, Bensaid, & Segales, 2017). A recent study in
alpacas demonstrated efficient animal-to-animal transmission (Adney,
Bielefeldt-Ohmann, Hartwig, & Bowen, 2016) but, to our knowledge,
evidence for transmission between animals from other species has not
been reported. To study whether MERS-CoV might be transmitted
between pigs, an experimental transmission study in this animal model
was designed and performed under direct and indirect contact settings.
2 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 | Experimental design
Fifteen six to eight-week-old Yorkshire 9 Landrace pigs (Ca N’Arola
S.L., Castelltercol, Barcelona, Spain) were housed at Biosafety Level
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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3 (BSL-3) animal facilities (IRTA-CReSA, Barcelona, Spain), and
divided into three groups: G1, MERS-CoV-inoculated pigs (P1–P5);
G2, direct contacts (P6–P10); G3, indirect contacts (P11–P15). Three
extra animals were used as negative controls (G4, P16–P18). Animals
from G1, G2 and G3 were housed in the same experimental box unit
but placed in two different pens. The pens were separated by two
fences with a 30 cm distance among them (Figure 1). Tarpaulin, from
the ceiling to the floor, was used to avoid contact between pen 1
and pen 2. Tarpaulin was also placed in the front doors of both pens.
At the beginning of the experiment, G1 was housed in pen 1, and
G2 and G3 in pen 2.
G1 was inoculated with 107 TCID50 (50% tissue culture
infectious dose) MERS-CoV (passage 7 human isolate HCoV-
EMC/2012) in 3 mL saline solution via intranasal route (1.5 mL
in each nostril). Two days later, all tarpaulins were removed and
G2 pigs were moved from pen 2 to pen 1 until the end of the
study.
All animals were monitored daily for clinical signs (sneezing,
coughing, nasal discharge and/or dyspnoea), as well as rectal temper-
atures until day 10 post-inoculation (PI). Nasal swabs (NS) were
obtained on days 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 PI from all animals and at days 7, and
10 PI from G1. Animals from G2 and G3 were also sampled at 5, 6,
9 and 12 days PI, corresponding to days 3, 4, 7 and 10 after direct
(G2) and indirect (G3) contact with G1.
2.2 | Sampling procedures
Two independent NS were collected and placed in PBS (for PCR anal-
ysis) and DMEM containing antimicrobial drugs (for detection of infec-
tious virus); swabbing was performed deep in both sides of the nasal
cavity. Sera were obtained before challenge and at 7, 15 and 26 days
PI, and they were subsequently used to detect the presence of
MERS-CoV-specific antibodies. Negative control pigs were sampled
(NS and sera) and euthanized before the start of the experiment.
Daily environmental samples (ES) between day 0 and 10 PI were
obtained from air sampling and wall surface swabbing (Figure 1).
Briefly, swabs pre-moistened with transport medium (Copan Univer-
sal Transport Medium UTM-RT System) were collected from walls in
pen 1 and 2 (ES1 and ES2). Air sampling was performed using an air
sampler (Airport MD8 Sartorius device) located between pens, which
suctioned 50 L/min air volume for 20 min through a gelatin mem-
brane filter (ES3). Air from the box unit was sampled with
10 9 10 cm dry membrane filters located in the air extraction of the
box (ES4). ES were tested for the presence of viral RNA.
2.3 | Virus detection
Viral RNA from NS and ES was extracted with NucleoSpin RNA
virus kit (Macherey-Nagel, Germany) following the manufacturer’s
F IGURE 1 Schematic representation of the experimental animal box. Boxes in the animal facility of the biosafety level 3 at IRTA-CReSA
are behind two sets of doors (with a shower in between) following the standards of a negative pressure room. Animals were distributed into
two pens separated by two fences with a 30 cm distance between them. G1 (P1–P5) was allocated in pen 1 and G2 (P6–P10) and G3 (P11–
P15), in pen 2. Two days after inoculation of G1 with MERS-CoV, G2 was cohoused with G1 until the end of the experiment. Tarpaulin was
used to prevent contact between G1 and the other two groups during the firsts 2 days after inoculation. Environmental samples (ES) were
obtained from different locations, as represented in the scheme [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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instructions. The RNA extracts were tested by the UpE PCR (Raj
et al., 2013), and the techniques were carried on as previously (Ver-
gara-Alert, van den Brand, et al., 2017). NS were also evaluated for
the presence of infectious virus by titration in Vero cells, following
previous protocol (Vergara-Alert, van den Brand, et al., 2017).
2.4 | Humoral immune response assays
Serum samples from days 0, 7, 15 and 26 PI were tested to deter-
mine the specific S1-antibodies by a MERS-CoV S1-ELISA, and by a
specific virus neutralization assay, as previously described (Haagmans
et al., 2016).
3 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Similar to a previous experiment (Vergara-Alert, van den Brand,
et al., 2017), none of the pigs had appreciable rise in rectal tempera-
ture upon challenge, nor any clinical signs (data not shown). All
MERS-CoV-experimentally infected animals (P1–P5) shed viral RNA
at least from 1 to 4 days PI, and three of five pigs had detectable
viral RNA until 7 days PI (Figure 2a). Most importantly, all five
animals shed infectious virus during the first 4 days PI (Figure 2b).
Viral RNA was detected in four of five cohoused, direct contact ani-
mals (G2) at least one time PI. The MERS-CoV RNA load of G2 pigs,
however, was lower than those of G1 (Figure 2a). No viral RNA or
infectious virus was detected in swabs from G3 (P11–P15) and con-
trol pigs (P16–P18).To test whether seroconversion occurred, serum
samples were tested with a specific recombinant MERS-CoV
S1-ELISA and for neutralizing antibodies against MERS-CoV. All five
MERS-CoV infected animals (P1–P5) had detectable levels of
S1-antibodies 2- and 3-weeks after the infection (Figure 2c). The
specificity of the response was confirmed by virus neutralization
assay. In P1–P4 (but not in P5), serum neutralizing MERS-CoV-speci-
fic titres (1:40–1:160) were detected at 1- and 2-week PI (Fig-
ure 2d). However, at week 3 PI, the virus neutralizing antibodies
decreased (1:20–1:40). No MERS-CoV-specific antibodies were
detected in serum of G2, G3 and control pigs. In environmental sam-
ples, very low levels of viral RNA were detected at different time
points, with a peak at day 5 PI (Table 1).
Other livestock besides dromedaries are susceptible to MERS-CoV
infection (Crameri et al., 2016; Falzarano et al., 2014; Haagmans et al.,
2015; Munster et al., 2013; Vergara-Alert, van den Brand, et al., 2017;
de Wit et al., 2013, 2017); thus, they might be potential intermediate
F IGURE 2 Viral shedding and antibody responses after experimental inoculation of MERS-CoV into pigs (G1), and after direct (G2) or
indirect (G3) exposure of non-infected pigs with G1. (a) Viral RNA and (b) infectious MERS-CoV from pigs nasal swab samples collected at
different times after challenge. Each line or bar represents an individual animal. (c) MERS-CoV S1 antibody responses were analysed in serum
from all animals at post-inoculation days 0, 7, 15 and 26. An ELISA with recombinant MERS-CoV S1 protein was used, and results are
represented individually. (d) Individual MERS-CoV neutralization titres from pigs as determined from serum. Dashed lines depict the detection
limit of the assays. Ct, cycle threshold; MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus; OD, optical density; PRNT90, 90% plaque
reduction neutralization test; TCID50, 50% tissue culture infective dose [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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hosts of the virus. However, transmission studies have only been per-
formed in alpacas. Here, no MERS-CoV effective transmission was
observed between pigs, as sustained by two main facts. First, viral
RNA was detected from four of the five cohoused animals (G2), but at
levels relatively similar to those found in environmental samples, and
during a shorter period time than G1. Second, seroconversion was
only observed in MERS-CoV-infected group pigs (G1), but specific
antibodies were not detected in G2 or G3.
In summary, using our pig model of MERS-CoV infection
(Vergara-Alert, van den Brand, et al., 2017), we analysed animal-to-
animal transmission of MERS-CoV. Although the role of Suidae in the
transmission of MERS-CoV should be further clarified, unlike camelids,
pigs do not seem to be able to transmit MERS-CoV efficiently, sug-
gesting that the role of pigs as reservoir is probably negligible.
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TABLE 1 Viral RNA from air sampling and wall surface swabbing at different times after MERS-CoV infection. Swabs were collected from
the walls in pen 1 and pen 2 (ES1 and ES2), air sampling was performed with an air device (ES3), and circulating air from the box was sampled
with filters located in the ceiling air extraction of the room (ES4)
Sample
Post-inoculation day
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ES1 n.d. 40.26 40.86 n.d. n.d. 36.35 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
ES2 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
ES3 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 40.56 40.52 39.78 n.d. n.d. n.d.
ES4 n.d. 40.28 40.69 n.d. n.d. 40.31 n.d. 39.87 n.d. n.d. n.d.
ES, environmental sample; n.d., non-detected.
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